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Abstract
Following on from the work of Birchenhall, Jessen, Osborn & Simpson (1999) on
predicting US business cycle regimes we apply the same methodology to construct a
one period ahead model of classical business cycle regimes in the UK.  Birchenhall et
al (1999) used regime data implied by the NBER dating of peaks and troughs.  In the
UK there is no comparable dating committee and our first task is to date the UK peaks
and troughs.  Application of a simple mechanical rule based on changes in GDP
produces a set of acceptable turning points, with one exception that is attributable to
the 3-day working week in 1974.  Based on data from 1963 to 1999, we date three
business cycle peaks at 1973 Q3, 1979 Q2 and 1990 Q2 together with troughs at 1975
Q3, 1981 Q1 and 1992 Q2.  Starting with a number of real and financial leading
indicators, several parsimonious one-quarter-ahead models are selected largely on the
basis of the SIC criterion.  A number of interesting results emerge from this
investigation.  A real M4 variable is consistently found to have predictive content.
One model that performs well combines this with UK and German short-term interest
rates.  The role of the latter variable emphasises the open nature of the UK economy.
JEL classification: C22, C32, E32, E44.
Keywords: business cycle dating, financial variables, leading indicators, logistic
classification models.Predicting UK Business Cycles
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1. Introduction
Both policy makers and private agents have a serious interest in the occurrence of
recessions in economic activity and thus show an interest in leading indicators that
help in anticipating the onset of recession and recovery.  The history of leading
indicators dates back to Burns and Mitchell’s (1946) discussion of “classical”
business cycle phases in the US.
Leading indicators for the US economy were produced by the US Department
of Commerce over a long period, with this system now maintained by the Conference
Board.  This methodology is based on combining a range of individual leading
indicators into a single composite indicator.  Green and Beckman (1993) discuss the
methodology used, but this may be summarised by saying that it depends on
averaging across individual leading indicators in order to extract the common
predictive signal.  Stock and Watson (1991, 1993) have also produced a composite
leading indicator for the US using a related, but more sophisticated, methodology.
These US leading indicators are traditionally associated with the so-called classical
business cycle regimes of recession and expansion in real activity.  That is, they are
designed to signal in advance periods of decline in overall activity (recessions) in
comparison with periods of overall growth (expansions).
In the UK the Office for National Statistics (ONS) had a system of business
cycle leading indicators until early 1997
1.  These were designed to lead the growth
cycle phase of UK gross domestic product (GDP), where growth cycle phases refer to
expansion and contractions relative to a long run trend (Moore, 1993).  The OECD
also produces composite leading indicators for the growth cycle in many countries
(Nilsson, 1987).  One important difficulty with any growth cycle analysis is that it is
based on a definition of trend and such definitions are essentially arbitrary.  It is also
arguably the case that policy makers and private agents are more interested in absolute
declines and expansions in activity than in growth cycle measures.  For these reasons,
this paper concentrates on classical business cycles for the UK and not growth cycles.
                                               
1 These are now being produced by NTC Research, telephone 01491 418625.Predicting UK Business Cycles
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Many papers have analysed the forecasting information contained in the
composite indicators mentioned above.  A number of recent studies have focused on
the role of individual leading indicator variables, in particular financial ones,
sometimes comparing the performance of a range of variables.  For example, Estrella
and Mishkin (1998) utilise a probit model (based on information from financial and
real macroeconomic variables, together with composite indicators) to forecast
recessions in the US GDP.  They find that the best out of sample predictor beyond one
quarter is the term structure of interest rates (the interest rate on long-term bonds
minus the short-term interest rate).  Using a more conventional linear approach,
Plosser and Rouwenhorst (1994) find strong and positive association between the term
structure and subsequent growth in industrial production for the US and Germany.
Further empirical evidence by Roma and Torous (1997) suggests that the US term
structure is relatively steeper at business cycle troughs and flatter at business cycle
peaks.  In recent analyses relevant to the UK, Andreou et al (1999) examine the role
of various financial leading indicators while Camba-Mendez et al (1999) adopt an
automatic approach to forming composite leading indicators for forecasting the GDP
growth of European countries using financial variables.
This paper follows the work of Birchenhall, Jessen, Osborn & Simpson
(1999), henceforth BJOS, to construct a composite leading indicator for classical
cycles in UK GDP.  Our indicator is constructed using a different approach to the
composite indicators mentioned above.  Its value is a number lying between zero and
one, which can be interpreted as the probability that the economy will be in an
expansion next period, alternatively one minus the indicator can be interpreted as the
probability that the economy will be in a recession.  Its construction is based on
logistic regression where the dependent variable is a zero/one dummy variable
identifying recessions and expansion regimes in the economy.  BJOS had the luxury
of a well-established set of dates for peaks and troughs in the US economy, namely
those published by the NBER Dating Committee.  There is no matching set of dates
for the UK and this paper offers a set of dates for the peaks and troughs for the classic
cycle in UK GDP before constructing the leading indicator.
The rest of the paper has the following structure.  Section 2 discusses the
dating of the classical cycle in UK GDP.  Section 3 introduces the leading indicatorPredicting UK Business Cycles
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data from which the composite indicator is constructed. Section 4 briefly outlines the
methodology developed in BJOS to construct the composite indicator.  Section 5
presents the results from applying this methodology to the regimes implied by the
dates presented in Section 2.  Section 6 offers concluding remarks.
2. Dating Classical Cycles in UK GDP
Business cycle dating has generally been performed on US data, with Boldin (1994)
comparing the performance of various approaches.  Dating exercises which have been
undertaken outside the US based on the concept of the classical business cycle include
Artis, Kontolemis and Osborn (1997) for monthly G7 and European industrial
production, while Harding and Pagan (1999) date the GDP cycles of the US, UK and
Australia.  Both of these papers use procedures based on the Bry and Boschan (1971)
algorithm.  The principle aim of this paper is to provide a UK business cycle leading
indicator, not to provide a robust methodology for dating turning points.  Therefore,
we side-step the dating issue and apply a simple mechanical rule to UK GDP in order
to produce a set of acceptable turning points.
The following rules describe how turning points were identified in UK
seasonally adjusted quarterly GDP (this is an index measure at market prices) over the
sample 1963 to 1999.  Table 1 defines a formal description of the rule where Y is
GDP. In words this implies the following.
Peaks: Period t is a peak if the following are true.
1. The peak value is no less than the previous 4 quarters.
2. The peak value is no less than the following 4 quarters.
3. The peak value is greater than the following 2 quarters.
Troughs: Period t is a trough if the following are true.
4. The trough value is no greater than the previous 4 quarters.
5. The trough value is no greater than the following 4 quarters.
6. The trough value is less than the 2 following periods.Predicting UK Business Cycles
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Peak Trough
1 DiYt ‡  0 for i = 1,..,4 DiYt £  0 for i = 1,..,4
2 DiYt+i ‡  0 for i = 1,..,4 DiYt+i £  0 for i = 1,..,4
3 D1Yt+1 < 0 and D2Yt+2 < 0 D1Yt+1 > 0 and D2Yt+2 > 0
Table 1: Rules for Dating Peaks and Troughs
Applying the rule to UK GDP resulted in the turning points in Table 2 that are
accompanied by the cycle duration in quarters.  Here there is a clear asymmetry
between duration of expansions and recessions.
Having decided on the peaks and troughs all time periods can be classified as
either one of expansion or one of contraction. Periods of expansion start with the
period following a trough and run up to and include the next peak. Periods of
contraction (or periods of recession) start with the period following a peak and run up
to and include the next trough.
Date Peak or Trough Duration (quarters)
1973 Q3 Peak 31
1974 Q1 Trough
*
1975 Q3 Trough 8
1979 Q2 Peak 15
1981 Q1 Trough 7
1990 Q2 Peak 37
1992 Q2 Trough 8
* Trough at 74Q1 rejected as a distortion due to 3 day working week
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The graphs in Figure 1 show the full sample of the logarithm of UK GDP then
each of the recession sub-phases.  Note the vertical axis is the natural logarithm of
GDP multiplied by 10 in the first graph and multiplied by 100 in the three regime
graphs.  A word on the line plots and shading is also in order.  A point lying on the
vertical line marked 79 represents the value of GDP in the first quarter of 1979.  That
is to say the observation for a variable is plotted at the start of the interval that
represents that quarter.  The shaded areas represent recessions and thus cover the
periods that start in the quarter following a peak up to and including the next trough.
For example, the second recession includes the quarters running from 1979 Q3 up to
and including 1981 Q1.  In the graph for the second recession the shaded area starts at
1979 Q3 and reaches out to 1981 Q2 as this point marks the end of 1981 Q1.  The
value of GDP at 1981 Q2 marks the end of the recession, not the observation at 1981
Q1.
The reader’s attention is drawn to the first recession, which the rule suggests
starts at 1973 Q3, but offers two subsequent troughs namely 1974 Q1 and 1975 Q3.
The first trough is rejected on the grounds that the low value of GDP in 1974 Q1, and
the subsequent rises in 1974 Q2 and 1974 Q3, reflects the impact of the 3-day
working week associated with a miner’s strike.  While this judgement removes the
difficulty arising from the two adjacent troughs it has to be suggested that the timing
of the start of this recession is not straightforward and some uncertainty remains.  In a
similar vein the rise in GDP in 1979 Q4 and fall in 1980 Q1 suggest the dating of the
onset of the second recession is not clear-cut.  Such qualifications to the dating of
these recessions is not used in the construction of the composite indicator, rather the
construction of the models assumes the regimes are known with certainty.  The reader
will need to keep this in mind when assessing the indicators offered.
Referring to the authoritative work of Dow (1998) these three recessions are
those identified by him as ‘major recessions’ for the UK.  As Dow is essentially
looking for growth recessions the precise dating will differ, but the three classical
recessions identified above map broadly onto matching recessions in Dow’s work.
Dow attributes the first two of these recessions at least partly to external events
(especially the OPEC oil price rises), whereas the third is viewed as having its origins
purely in domestic factors.Predicting UK Business Cycles
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The first recession in Britain 1973-75 was preceded by a large injection of
government spending into the economy known as the ‘Barber Boom’ named after the
Chancellor of the Exchequer at the time.  Dow (1998) describes how between 1972
and 1973 total final expenditure rose by nearly 9% and was accompanied by a boom
abroad that led to a rapid rise in exports.  The recession followed the boom and was
also the reaction to the oil price shock and a rapid tightening of monetary policy that
in turn was a reaction to the accelerating inflation.  The recession was exacerbated at
the beginning of 1974 by the effect of the 3-day working week.   This was when the
government had to restrict industry to a short working week because a coal strike had
reduced coal supplies to power stations at the end of 1973 in the so-called ‘winter of
discontent’.
The second recession 1979-81 was attributable to the rise in the price of oil for
the second OPEC shock but this was exacerbated by a large exchange rate rise.  This
practically stopped export growth so was largely deflationary.  The 1979 budget was
also very deflationary with cuts in fiscal policy and tightening of monetary policy by
the Conservative government as they were trying to control the growth of broad
money; this was targeted between 1976 and 1986.
The third recession we identify as 1990-92, Dow dates as longer from 1989-93
when growth was below trend.  Dow suggests that the expansion of the 1980s should
not only be attributed to financial deregulation as there was a gap of five years
between the removal of lending controls and the time when credit creation started to
accelerate.  Instead Dow attributes the credit boom to the two dynamic developments
the growth of pervasive optimism about future prospects and the erosion of prudential
standards.  Dow concludes that the recession was not due to exogenous shocks, like
the previous two recessions, but was entirely due to a reversal of the over-confidence
that had been built up in the preceding boom years.  This recession was preceded by
unsustainable increases in asset prices, property prices and equity prices, these
crashed because of a loss of confidence and expectations.Predicting UK Business Cycles
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3. Leading Indicator Data
The events described previously that lead to the recession eras were varied in nature
and involved the UK operating as an open economy.  We will therefore analyse a
number of domestic and international leading indicators for their performance with
predicting the recession dates as given in Section 2 for UK GDP.  Essentially we are
looking at a variety of nominal and real variables that are deemed to be important in
explaining the real economy.
We were led by previous studies for the full range of data that we analyse.
Andreou et al (1999) find strong evidence for financial variables having leading
properties and Simpson et al (1999) investigate financial and other variables for
modelling recessions in UK GDP with a Markov-switching model.  Furthermore
Binner et al (1999) find useful leading indicator properties of UK M4 for inflation.
Of this range of variables we consistently found that inflation and a subset of financial
variables survived the selection process, with this subset being broad money, stock
prices and interest rates.  There is also strong evidence from the effect of international
variables in the form of US stock prices and German interest rates.  Variables that
were eliminated early on were domestic consumption, dividend yields, exchange
rates, housing starts, house price index, CBI change in optimism measure and US
short-term interest rates.  All the variables that we analyse are detailed in the data
appendix at the end of this paper with the abbreviation, description, sample dates,
source and transformation used in the modelling.  We transform money, stock prices
and the GDP deflator data by taking logs and then an annual difference to smooth the
data
2.  For the interest rate series we analyse the UK treasury bill yield (TBY) as the
short rate, 20 year par yield on British Government Securities for the long rate (LR)
and then the difference of these is the term structure (LR-TBY).  Graphs of TBY and
the German short-term interest rate series (the FIBOR) are shown at the top of Figure
2, with recession periods shaded.
                                               
2 Our experiments investigated the use of one and two-quarter differences, but the annual difference
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To construct the real variables the nominal series is divided by of the GDP
deflator.  The term structure and the real term structure (RTS i.e. the long rate minus
short rate minus inflation rate) are shown in Figure 2.  “Real M4” (RM4) is created by
dividing the broad money series by the GDP deflator.  The fourth difference of the log
of RM4 is shown in Figure 3 along with the fourth difference of this series which is
found to be important in the Results section.  “Real Stock Price” index (RSP) is
created by dividing the stock market index by the GDP deflator, the fourth difference
of the logarithm of this is shown in Figure 3 along with nominal US stock price index
– the Standard and Poor’s 500 common stock index – with the same transformation
applied.
4. Modelling the Probability of Expansion
A fuller account of the methodology used to construct our composite leading indicator
is presented in BJOS.  A brief outline is presented here to clarify the subsequent
discussion of the results.  Let wt represent a complete history of all possible
information about the state of the economy up to and including period t.  It is assumed
that given wt there is no uncertainty in classifying period t into one of expansion or
contraction.  If p(wt) is the probability that period t is one of expansion given wt then
either p(wt) = 1 or p(wt) = 0.  Furthermore, it is assumed that the probability p(wt-1) of
period t being one of expansion given the complete history up and including period t-
1 is well-defined for all periods.  A coincidental indicator of regimes is a model
based on incomplete histories that approximates the true indicator p(wt).  A one-
period ahead indicator is a model based on incomplete histories up to and including
period t-1 which approximates the true indicator p(wt-1).  In this paper we concentrate
on the task of constructing a one-period ahead indicator.  To this end we consider
models of the form
pt = lf (b¢xt-1)               (1)
where lf is the logistic function i.e. lf (z) = exp(z) / [ 1 + exp(z) ], b is a vector of
coefficients and xt-1 is a vector of variables observed before or in period t-1.  Let ytPredicting UK Business Cycles
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indicate the regime at time t so that yt = 1 if period t is one of expansion and yt = 0 if
period t is one of contraction.  Given a set of observations yt on regimes and xt on
leading indicators for t = 1,…,T, then the likelihood of the model is
L = P1lf (xt) P0(1-lf (xt))            (2)
where the first product is taken over all periods for which yt = 1 and the second
product is taken over all periods for which yt = 0.  Constructing a composite indicator
involves choosing xt and finding the maximum likelihood estimate of b.  Selection of
xt involves the prior selection of potential variables followed by an automated search
algorithm that aims to minimise the Schwartz’s Information Criterion (SIC), namely
SIC = - 2log L + n log T            (3)
where L is the likelihood, n is the number of estimated parameters and T is the number
of observations in the sample used for estimation.  The advantage of such penalised
likelihood procedures is that they tend to lead to better approximations of true
structures than the penalty free likelihood in a wide range of circumstances.
The automated search procedure works as follows.  We select a priori a set of
K variables x1t, …, xKt.  The algorithm then finds that subset of K-1 variables that
gives the lowest value of SIC over the sample period.  This subset is then used in the
next stage and the omitted variable is excluded.  Working with the selected set of K-1
variables the algorithm considers all subsets of K-2 variables and chooses that which
gives the lowest SIC value.  The omitted variable is excluded and this continues until
there is only one variable left.  At the final stage the algorithm has K selected subsets
with associated SIC values and of these it chooses that subset which gives the lowest
SIC value.  It is to be stressed that the algorithm is not an exhaustive search of all
subsets of the original K variables.  A major implication of this partial search is that
the final selection is not guaranteed to be that subset which minimises SIC; a variable
maybe rejected prematurely.  Furthermore, this implies that the inclusion or exclusion
of one or more variables can alter the selected set even if the included or excluded
variables do not appear in the final selection.  A further complication arises from the
very real possibility of getting a spurious “perfect” fit in which the model is able to
correctly classify all points in the sample set.Predicting UK Business Cycles
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All in all, the selection of the prior set of variables is non-trivial and in
practice requires us to draw on prior experience and expectations.  In particular, it is
possible to substantially improve SIC values by imposing appropriate restrictions on
parameters.  For example, the use of “real” variables and the removal of price and
inflation variables have proved to be fruitful.
5. Results
Each variable is “normalised” prior to estimation.  To normalise a variable x, the
mean a and standard deviation s are calculated over the estimation period and x is
replaced by x¢ ¢ = (x-a)/s.  The results presented in Table 3 are based on an estimation
period running from 1966 Q1 to 1997 Q1 giving 125 observations.  Data from 1963
Q1 to 1965 Q4 were used for various lag and difference operations.  Data from 1997
Q2 to 1999 Q2 were used for out of sample tests of the models.  Table 3 gives the
estimated coefficients for the normalised variables together with summary statistics
(RMSE, -2LogL, SIC) and error counts for a number models.  Errors counts are given
for In Sample (1966 Q1 to 1997 Q1) and Out of Sample (1997 Q2 to 1999 Q2).  In
each case the error counts are given separately for expansion and contraction periods.
In reporting the error counts we describe the count as a percentage as well as the
numerical count.  For example, the Model A in sample error count for expansionary
periods is 2% (3/102) indicating that the rounded down percentage is 2% and the
count is 3 out of 102.
To calculate these error counts, the estimated probability p(xt) is converted
into an expansion forecast if p(xt) > 0.5.  The forecast is of recession if p(xt) £ 0.5.
Although this 0.5 rule is natural, there are also arguments to suggest that the rule for
expansion prediction should be if p(xt) > p, where p is the proportion of expansionary
periods in the sample.  See BJOS for a discussion of this issue.  To reflect the latter,
and following BJOS, an estimated probability is considered to fall in the uncertain
region when it is greater than 0.5 but less than p, with p = 0.816 for this sample
period.  The reported error counts are based on the 0.5 rule, but we offer the uncertain
count to give a feeling for the impact of using the p-rule.  The reader may wish to look
at the plots in Figures 4 and 5 with the p-rule in mind.Predicting UK Business Cycles
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We illustrate the stages of our modelling by the results presented in Table 3.
Initially a range of nominal variables were tried in combination with the inflation
series (the fourth difference of the log of the GDP deflator), both with lags up to eight.
Of these, the single nominal series that captured the three recession phases with the
lowest SIC was M4 together with inflation.  The resulting model is shown as Model A
in Table 3 and the resulting regime probabilities are shown in Figure 4.  Model A
shows that two lags have been selected for M4 and inflation (though not strictly the
same lags) with coefficients of similar magnitudes and opposite signs ,so we find a
definite case for creating real M4 (RM4).  Analogous results were obtained for
nominal stock prices with inflation though this was poor at selecting the business
cycle phases.  Nominal TBY consistently survived as did the term structure with
inflation.
We next go on to model RM4 with a combination of other variables.  The
main surprise from the models that include RM4, is in almost all cases they suffered
from spurious perfect fit.  To remove these spurious perfect fit models we had to
impose a number of restrictions.  Essentially we used specific lags of variables
suggested by other models e.g. using Stock Prices lagged one period.
In Model B we add the real stock prices (RSP), the term structure (TS) and
inflation to RM4.  The first attempt to construct B led to a spurious perfect fit but
suggested the imposition of a selection of variables.  These variables were
D4Log(RSP)–1 (the annual difference of the log of real stock prices lagged one period),
D4Log(RM4)-1, D4Log(RM4)-5 (the annual difference of real M4 lagged over one and
five periods), TS-1 (the term structure lagged one period) and D4Log(PI)-5 (the rate of
inflation lagged five periods).  This model reduces the SIC in comparison to Model A
but predicts the 1990s recession too early as shown in the top right-hand chart of
Figure 4.  We noticed in B that the term structure variable was matched by an
inflation variable with a negative sign.  The latter lead us to experiment with the
“real” term structure (with lags one to eight) this produces Model C.  This model
reduces the SIC but increases the error count in expansions as a spike reappears in
1983 (see bottom left-hand chart in Figure 4).
A surprising feature was that RM4 consistently appeared with lags one and
five and with opposite signed coefficients on the two lags.  This led us to experimentPredicting UK Business Cycles
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with the second difference of RM4.  Therefore a new variable is created by taking the
fourth difference of D4Log(RM4) giving D4D4Log(RM4)-1.  The outcome is Model D
which reduces SIC but increases the error count in contractions as it is not picking up
enough of the 1990s recession, see bottom right-hand chart in Figure 4.
Model E includes nominal treasury bill yield (TBY – initially with up to eight
lags) and the second difference of RM4.  TBY is selected with one lag which reduces
the SIC but increases the in sample error count for expansions.  We move then to
include the RSP variable which produces Model F, this time lag five of TBY is also
selected with a negative normalised coefficient.  The SIC is improved upon but not all
the 1990s recession is adequately predicted, see top right-hand chart of Figure 5.
Building on Models A to E, we then examine the role of international
variables.  US stock prices and both US and German and interest rate series were
considered, but only US stock prices and German interest rates survived the selection
process.  Model G adds the US S&P 500 nominal index to the variables of Model F to
reflect the open nature of the UK stock market.  Model G selects real stock prices for
the UK with a longer lag (compared to previous models) at three and US stock returns
are selected at lag four with a negative coefficient; only lag one is selected for TBY.
The SIC is reduced but the prediction of the 1990s recession is again inaccurate, see
bottom left-hand chart of Figure 5.  A further problem with this model is an inaccurate
count out of sample for expansions.
Finally Model H takes Model G and adds to it German short-term interest rates
(the FIBOR with lags up to eight).  However, this variable eliminates the effect of
both stock markets and drastically reduces the SIC giving the best overall in sample
error count.  Most significant from Figure 5 (bottom right-hand chart) is that the
1990s recession is predicted for effectively its whole duration by the addition of this
variable.
Model G is the only model that had one out of sample error with estimated
probability of 0.16 in 1998 Q3.  Although GDP did not fall at this time, there was a
good deal of concern at the end of 1998 that the UK was entering into a recession.
Indeed GDP “flattened off” in the fourth quarter of 1998 and the first quarter of 1999,
while industrial production actually fell in these two quarters.  While the detailedPredicting UK Business Cycles
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forecasts are wrong, particularly that for the second quarter of 1998, this model is
more in line with the experience of 1998 than many of the alternative models which
give no hint of a recession in 1998.
SIC, error counts and subjective inspection of the probability plots suggest
Model H is preferable overall to other models.  The use of D4D4Log(RM4)-1 seems to
have smoothed the probability series just before the third recession, but emphasized
the “spike” in the 1983.  The German interest rate is the most significant international
variable of those examined and helps largely explain the 1990s recession in the UK.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we offer dates for classifying UK GDP into classical cycles of expansion
and recession.  We also construct a composite leading indicator for this cycle using
the methodology developed in BJOS.  Not withstanding the difficulties in dating
cycles and constructing leading indicators, we believe that the results of our efforts
are of interest.  In particular, the results suggest that German short-term interest rates
complement UK real broad money and the treasury bill yield, adding predictive
information for regimes in UK GDP compared to that available in domestic variables
on their own.Predicting UK Business Cycles
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Model
Variable A B C D E F G H
Intercept 3.597 (4.55) 4.889 (3.97) 4.078 (4.52) 3.773 (4.45) 3.834 (4.55) 4.706 (4.02) 4.582 (4.12) 8.268 (2.904)
D4Log(M4)-2 3.742 (3.26)
D4Log(M4)-5 -4.983 (-3.81)
D4Log(RSP)–1 1.879 (2.26) 1.762 (2.41) 1.691 (2.65) 2.376 (2.40)
D4Log(RSP)–3 2.357 (2.63)
D4Log(RM4)-1 4.172 (3.21) 3.284 (3.64)
D4Log(RM4)-5 -4.167 (-3.13) -4.401 (-4.04)
D4D4Log(RM4)-1 3.603 (4.02) 2.699 (3.61) 2.978 (3.12) 3.929 (2.96) 5.584 (2.86)








RTS-5 3.262 (3.76) 2.459 (3.71)
Summary Statistics
RMSE 0.2454 0.2047 0.2084 0.2223 0.2381 0.2001 0.1915 0.1631
-2Log L 47.26 31.8 35.72 39.87 43.96 30.9 30.79 20.38
SIC 71.41 60.77 59.86 59.19 58.44 55.04 54.93 39.69
Errors In Sample
Expansions 2% (3/102) 1% (2/102) 2% (3/102) 2% (3/102) 4% (5/102) 1% (2/102) 2% (3/102) 1% (2/102)
Contractions 34% (8/23) 21% (5/23) 21% (5/23) 30% (7/23) 21% (5/23) 21% (5/23) 17% (4/23) 17% (4/23)
Uncertain (18/125) (10/125) (9/125) (14/125) (8/125) (9/125) (6/125) (7/125)
Errors Out of Sample
Expansions 0% (0/9) 0% (/9) 0% (/9) 0% (/9) 0% (0/9) 0% (/9) 11% (1/9) 0% (0/9)
Contractions 0% (0/0) 0% (0/0) 0% (0/0) 0% (0/0) 0% (0/0) 0% (0/0) 0% (0/0) 0% (0/0)
Uncertain (0/9) (0/9) (0/9) (0/9) (0/9) (0/9) (0/9) (0/9)
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(G) Real M4, real SP, US S&P 500 and nominal TBY                                    (H) Real M4, nominal TBY and nominal FIBOR
Figure 5: Filter Probability ChartsPredicting UK Business Cycles
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A. Data Appendix
Variable Full Name Sample Source/ code SA or
NSA*
Transform
GDP Gross Domestic Product index: Constant market prices 1995=100 55q1 – 99q2 ONS/ YBEZ SA D4 of Log
PI GDP Gross Value Added at basic prices: Implied deflator1995=100 55q1 – 99q2 ONS/ CGBV SA D4 of Log
INF Inflation Rate 56q1 – 99q2 100*(log(PI)-log(PI(-4))) SA -
SP FT actuaries all share index (10 April 1962=100) 63q1 – 99q3 ONS/ AJMA NSA D4 of Log
RSP Real stock prices 63q1 – 99q3 SP / PI NSA D4 of Log
DY FT actuaries all share index: dividend yield % 63q1 – 99q3 ONS/ AJMD NSA None
M4 Money stock M4 (end period): level #m 63q1 – 99q2 ONS/ AUYN SA D4 of Log
RM4 Real M4 63q1 – 99q2 M4 / PI SA D4 of Log
TBY Treasury Bills 3 month yield 60q2 – 99q3 ONS/ AJRP NSA None
LR BGS: long-dated (20 years): Par yield - % per annum 57q1 – 99q2 ONS/ AJLX NSA None
TS Term Structure 60q2 – 99q2 LR - TBY NSA None
RTS Real Term Structure 60q2 – 99q2 LR-TBY-INF NSA None
US S&P US Standard & Poor’s index of 500 common stocks(monthly average) 60q1 – 99q3 Datastream NSA D4 of Log
USFF US Federal Funds interest rate 60q1 – 99q3 OECD NSA None
FIBOR German Frankfurt inter-bank offered rate 60q1 – 99q3 OECD NSA None
CONS Consumers’ Expenditure 1990 Prices 55q1 – 99q2 OECD SA D4 of Log
USXCH GB/US Dollar Exchange Rate month average / Quantum 60q1 – 99q3 OECD NSA -
HCPI CPI Housing / Index publication base 62q1 – 99q2 OECD NSA D4 of Log
HS Housing Starts 57q1 – 98q1 ONS/ CTOZ SA D4 of Log
59q1 - 71q4 ONS/ DKDK SA CBIO** CBI Change in Optimism
72q1 – 98q4 Datastream NSA
None
* SA = Seasonally Adjusted and NSA = Not Seasonally Adjusted.
** The CBI Industrial Trend Survey was only conducted three times a year between 1959 and 1971 and the ONS have interpolated these values to give a quarterly series before seasonally adjusting it
with X-11.  After this the author uses a regression with seasonal dummies to seasonally adjust the data.
Table A.1: Data descriptions with sample period, source and transformationsPredicting UK Business Cycles
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